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	 absTraCT
In recent years debates on as well as funding of impact evaluations of development 
interventions have flourished. Unfortunately, controversy regarding the promotion and applica-
tion of randomized experiments (RE) has led to a sense of polarization in the development policy 
and evaluation community. As some proponents claim epistemological supremacy of REs (with 
respect to attribution) the counter reaction among others has been rejection. Needless to say, 
such extreme positions are counterproductive to reaching a goal that is commonly endorsed: 
to learn more about what works and why in development. This paper discusses the prospects 
and limitations of REs from the perspective of three categories of challenges in impact evalu-
ation: delimitation and scope, attribution versus explanation, and implementation challenges. 
The implicit lesson is twofold. First of all, the question ‘to randomize or not to randomize’ is 
overrated in the current debate. Limitations in scope, applicability as well as implementation 
will necessarily restrict the use of REs in development impact evaluation. There is a risk that the 
current popularity of REs in certain research and policy circles might lead to a backlash as too 
high expectations of REs may quicken its demise. More importantly, given the nature and scope 
of the challenges discussed in the paper, more energy should be devoted to developing and test-
ing ‘rigorous’ mixed method approaches within a framework of theory-driven evaluation.
  Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Frans Leeuw and Robrecht Renard for their comments on this 
paper. Any remaining errors are my own.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
	 résumé
Ces dernières années, les évaluations d’impact des interventions en matière de dé-
veloppement ont fait l’objet de nombreux débats et ont été largement financées. Malheureuse-
ment, la controverse au sujet de la promotion et de l’application des expériences randomisées 
(ER) a suscité un sentiment de polarisation parmi ceux qui définissent et évaluent les politiques 
de développement. Comme certains partisans revendiquent la suprématie épistémologique des 
ER (pour ce qui est de l’attribution), la réaction de certains autres a pris la forme d’un rejet. Il 
va sans dire que ces positions extrêmes sont contreproductives dans la poursuite d’un objectif 
partagé par tous : en savoir plus long sur ce qui fonctionne en matière de développement, et 
pourquoi. Ce document commente les perspectives et les limitations des ER du point de vue de 
trois catégories de défis dans l’évaluation d’impact : délimitation et étendue, attribution versus 
explication, et les défis liés à la mise en œuvre. La leçon implicite est double. Premièrement, 
la question ‘randomiser ou non’ prend trop d’importance dans le débat actuel. Des limitations 
d’étendue, d’applicabilité ainsi que de mise en œuvre restreindront fatalement l’utilisation des 
ER dans l’évaluation de l’impact du développement. Il se pourrait que la popularité actuelle 
des ER dans certains cercles de chercheurs et de décideurs entraîne un retour de bâton, car des 
attentes trop élevées par rapport aux RE pourraient accélérer leur abandon. Enfin, et surtout, 
étant donné la nature et l’étendue des défis commentés dans ce document, il est nécessaire de 
consacrer plus d’énergie à l’élaboration et à la mise à l’épreuve d’approches mixtes ‘rigoureuses’ 
dans un cadre d’évaluation basé sur la théorie. • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
1.	 The	rising	sTar	of	impaCT	evaluaTion	in	developmenT
The question of ‘what works and why’ in development assistance has received con-
siderable attention over the past few years. The major reason is that many outside of develop-
ment agencies believe that achievement of results has been poor, or at best not convincingly 
established. In the last decades of the previous century part of the development assistance par-
adigm was about ‘thinking big’, e.g. structural adjustment policies as key factors in generating 
stability and growth in developing countries. Correspondingly, a lot of intellectual effort went 
into analyses of development at the macro level, with scores of economists working on growth 
regressions, trying to identify the key factors that were determining country growth of GDP and 
the role of development assistance therein. Growing pessimism within the international com-
munity about the effectiveness of macro interventions, in part fuelled by the lack of decisive evi-
dence from the academic community, gradually led to a shift in development paradigm towards 
more ‘thinking small’ (Easterly, 2001; Cohen and Easterly, 2009). Yet, the state of evidence on 
the effectiveness of concrete policy interventions (programs, policies) was far from promising 
either. Towards the end of the previous century the realization grew that, given the evidence 
base, it was hard to determine the extent to which interventions were making a difference 
(Baker, 2000). In 2006, an influential paper published by the Center for Global Development 
–“When will we ever learn?” (CGD, 2006)- pointed at an evaluation gap in development; despite 
enormous investments in development policy, the evidence base on what works was diagnosed 
as weak. According to the paper, too much of the evaluative work in development focused on 
process instead of results and credible evaluations of results were scarce. Fortunately, at the 
time of publication of this paper, the tide had already been gradually turning. A number of key 
events such as the endorsement of the Millennium Development Goals by the global community 
in 2001, the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, the 2005 Paris Decla-
ration on Development Effectiveness and the 2008 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Accra were signs of a growing results-focus in the development community, gradually paving the 
road for more attention to the assessment of effects of development interventions.
As a result of this evolution, in recent years debates on as well as funding of im-
pact evaluation have flourished. Impact evaluation can be roughly defined as the (growing) 
field of evaluative practices aimed at assessing the intended and unintended effects of policy 
interventions. One of the particularly productive areas in impact evaluation is (quasi-)experi-
mental impact evaluation, in particular randomized experiments. A number of initiatives, most 
notably the Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), Innovations for Poverty Action and the World Bank’s 
Spanish Impact Evaluation Fund, are creating a growing body of evaluative evidence based on 
randomized experiments.[1] The comparative advantage of the latter methodology,[2] as it has 
been argued widely, is its inherent strength to address the attribution problem in evaluation 
through counterfactual analysis. The basic idea of a randomized experiment (RE)[3] is that the 
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pared over time with the situation of an equivalent control group that is not affected by the in-
tervention. Allocation to either of these groups[1] is random. Consequently, in sufficiently large 
samples the probability that both groups are equivalent on all observable and non-observable 
characteristics except for intervention participation is very high (see for example Shadish et al., 
2002; Morgan and Winship, 2007). This inherent strength of REs can resolve the selection bias 
problem in evaluation. People that participate or are affected by an intervention usually differ 
from the population at large due to self-selection or targeting. As a result, simple comparisons 
between participants and people not covered by the intervention will be biased. Randomization 
of intervention benefits or participation addresses this issue. This particular feature of REs has 
been lauded by growing groups of researchers and decisionmakers in development. Indeed, for 
some the rise of REs signifies the beginning of a new era in development evaluation: “[c]reating 
a culture in which rigorous randomized evaluations are promoted, encouraged, and financed has 
the potential to revolutionize social policy during the 21st century, just as randomized trials rev-
olutionized medicine during the 20th” (The Lancet Editorial quoting Esther Duflo, 2004: 731). 
Recent examples of randomized experiments include Miguel and Kremer (2004) on deworming 
treatment in Kenya, Banerjee et al. (2007) on education in India, Olken (2007) on monitoring 
corruption in Indonesia, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) on returns to capital and access to fi-
nance in Mexico, or Karlan and Zinman (2009) on microcredit in the Philippines.
While the growing body of evidence based on REs certainly seems promising, the 
fact that some of the protagonists of the RE tradition, dubbed ‘randomistas’, perceive REs as 
the only way to produce rigorous evaluative evidence has led to a storm of critique.[2] Ravallion 
(2009a: 1) warns about the consequences of the growing influence of the ‘randomistas’: “Re-
searchers are turning down opportunities to evaluate public programs when randomization is 
not feasible. Doctoral students are searching for something to randomize. Philanthropic agen-
cies are sometimes unwilling to fund non-experimental evaluations.” A key argument against 
the alleged supremacy of REs[3] expressed by critics (see below), has been that if one randomly 
controls for all observable and non-observable confounders, one cannot generalize conclusions 
about effectiveness beyond the specific sample, as one does not know exactly in what aspects 
the experimental sample differs from the population at large (see for example Deaton, 2009). 
The phenomenon of REs being perceived as superior to other methods of impact 
evaluation by a part of the development community is not new and has also occurred in other 
disciplines and policy fields. REs have been applied since the early twentieth century in the fields 
of education, crime, health and social welfare mostly by psychologists, sociologists, economists 
and health scientists (see Oakley, 2000; Leeuw, 2009). Especially in evidence-based medicine 
REs have gained a prominent role, yet have also been criticized (see for example Worrall, 2007). 
In the field of international development, REs have been embraced mostly by economists. Rodrik 
(2008) and Deaton (2009) argue that this is due to mainly two reasons. First, they note a certain 
sense of disappointment among economists regarding the failure of economic theory in provid-
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the shortcomings in econometric methods for explaining effectiveness, mainly due to the iden-
tification problem.[1] As REs have been enthusiastically taken up by development economists, 
sharp critique has come from the same discipline, most notably from Rodrik (2008), Ravallion 
(2008, 2009a) and Deaton (2009).[2] Banerjee and Duflo (2008), two prominent ‘randomistas’, 
acknowledge much of the critique on REs. However, at the same time they counter the critique 
by arguing that most of it is not specific to randomized experiments but also applicable to non-
experimental observational studies. However, this is exactly a point that critics refer to. The fact 
that randomized experiments can be justifiably criticized on a number of key issues (see below) 
undermines the alleged claim to epistemological supremacy, a claim that many ‘randomistas’ 
explicitly or implicitly endorse.
[1]	 	Generally,	this	refers	to	the	problem	that	multiple	values	of	parameters	or	multiple	models	might	explain	a	cer-
tain	pattern	in	the	data.
[2]	 	See	also	Cohen	and	Easterly	(2009).IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
2.	 sCope
The controversy surrounding REs unfortunately has kindled a sense of polarization 
within the development research and evaluation community, and indeed also within practitioner 
and policymaker circles (see for example Cohen and Easterly, 2009), which is counterproductive 
to achieving the important goal that so many endorse: to promote a growth of knowledge on 
what works and why in development. In this paper, when discussing the multiple conceptual and 
methodological challenges in impact evaluation, I will recurrently refer to REs and their poten-
tial to address a particular challenge. The discussion will demonstrate that REs are not equipped 
to address all of these challenges. However, this should not lead to erroneous conclusions about 
the utility of REs. Whereas the potential role of REs (and quasi-experimental designs)[1] in im-
pact evaluation is probably overestimated by ‘randomistas’ and in some cases also policymak-
ers, they do possess a comparative advantage in addressing the issue of attribution (internal 
validity).
As a structure to the discussion I discern three key challenges in impact evaluation, 
each of which is further classified into sub issues. The classification is based on three pillars. 
First of all, it relies on an elaborate discussion in 2008-2009 with a community of practitioners 
and scholars working on impact evaluation in development.[2] The second pillar concerns a re-
view of the current literature on impact evaluation and development. Finally, my own empirical 
and conceptual work on impact evaluation also served as inspiration for the structure employed 
below.
Challenge 1: Delimitation. The scope of an impact evaluation can widely differ de-
pending on the nature of the evaluand, the types of effects that might occur, as well as the choic-
es that are made about the aspects to be assessed in detail. These choices can be determined by 
decisionmakers and/or researchers and may include the priorities of other stakeholder groups 
such as target groups.
Challenge 2: Attribution versus explanation. REs have a comparative advantage 
in determining the net effects[3] of an intervention with a high degree of internal validity. The-
ory can help to strengthen the internal validity of findings by elucidating how and why certain 















example	Cook	and	Campbell,	1979;	Shadish	et	al.,	2002).12 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
Challenge 3: Impact evaluation in practice. Good impact evaluation is good re-
search. Whereas many of the current debates on impact evaluation tend to center on arguments 
pro and against REs, in practice the validity of findings of any type of impact evaluation, includ-
ing REs, heavily depends on the extent to which a number of key design and implementation 
challenges have been appropriately addressed. 
In this paper the focus will be on methodological design and implementation aspects 
of impact evaluation. Less attention will be paid to the properties of statistical analysis within 
the context of REs or other methodological designs (see for example Heckman, 1992; Shadish et 
al. 2002; Cook, 2006; for development interventions see for example Deaton, 2009). IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
3.	 Challenge	1:	delimiTaTion
3.1.  The importance of stakeholder values
A first important criterion for delimitation in impact evaluation concerns the ques-
tion of ‘impact according to whom’. There is a strong movement in development research and 
practice which endorses the idea that impact evaluation is not only about assessing the effects 
of an intervention but also about underlying questions of what types of processes of change and 
effects are valued as important (either positive or negative) and by whom?[1]
This line of thought is most manifest in the evaluation tradition of participatory im-
pact evaluation. Nowadays, participatory methods have become ‘mainstream’ tools in develop-
ment in almost every area of policy intervention. The roots of participation in development lie in 
the rural sector, where Chambers (1995) and others developed the now widely used principles of 
Participatory Rural Appraisal.[2] Participatory evaluation approaches (see for example, Cousins 
and Whitmore, 1998) are built on the principle that stakeholders should be involved in some or 
all stages of the evaluation. In the case of impact evaluation participation includes aspects such 
as the determination of objectives, indicators to be taken into account, as well as stakeholder 
participation in data collection and analysis. In practice it can be useful to differentiate between 
stakeholder participation as a process and stakeholder perceptions and views as sources of evi-
dence (Cousins and Whitmore, 1998).
Randomized designs are not about stakeholder participation or elicitation of stake-
holder values. However, there is no reason to assume that REs may not be combined with par-
ticipatory processes and methods of data collection (Karlan, 2009). In practice a wide variety 
of methods are available (see for example IFAD, 2002; Mikkelsen, 2005; Pretty et al., 1995; 
Salmen and Kane, 2006). Stakeholder participation in impact evaluation can be beneficial in 
many ways, i.e. by enhancing the ownership and (possibly) utilization of an evaluation, improv-
ing the quality of the data collected from target populations, or strengthening local processes 
of governance. At the same time, participatory methods have been criticized on many grounds. 
Often mentioned critical aspects concern the limited applicability of impact evaluations with a 
high degree of participation especially in large-scale, comprehensive, multi-site interventions. 
In such contexts, organizing processes of stakeholder participation may not be feasible due to 
high costs and logistical barriers. In addition, there is some doubt about the reliability of infor-
mation based on stakeholder perceptions (e.g. due to risks of strategic responses, manipulation 
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An alternative approach for eliciting stakeholder values which does not rely on 
stakeholder participation is values inquiry and “refers to a variety of methods that can be ap-
plied to the systematic assessment of the value positions surrounding the existence, activities, 
and outcomes of a social policy and program” (Mark et al., 1999: 183). Values inquiry exercises 
may be more useful than participatory evaluation approaches in situations where policy makers 
are interested in a representative picture of the value positions of large groups of beneficiaries 
dispersed over large territories. 
3.2.  The impact of what?
When talking about the scope and delimitation of impact evaluation it is useful to 
address the following two questions: the impact of what and the impact on what (see also Vaes-
sen and Todd, 2008)? Regarding the impact of what, today more than ever one can speak of a 
‘continuum’ of interventions. At one end of the continuum are relatively simple projects charac-
terized by ‘single strand’ initiatives with explicit objectives, carried out within a relatively short 
timeframe, where interventions can be isolated, manipulated and measured. An impact evalua-
tion in the agricultural sector for example, will seek to attribute changes in crop yield to an inter-
vention such as a new technology or agricultural practice. In a similar guise, in the health sector, 
a reduction in malaria will be analyzed in relation to the introduction of bed nets. For these types 
of interventions, experimental and quasi-experimental designs may be appropriate for assess-
ing causal relationships. At the other end of the continuum are comprehensive programs with 
an extensive range and scope (increasingly at country, regional or global level), with a variety of 
activities that cut across sectors, themes and geographic areas, and emergent specific activities. 
Many of these interventions address aspects that are assumed to be critical for effective devel-
opment yet difficult to define and measure, such as human security, good governance, political 
will and capacity, sustainability, and effective institutional systems. 
One of the trends in development is that donors are moving up the ‘aid chain’. 
Whereas in the past donors were very much involved in ‘micro-managing’ their own projects 
and (sometimes) bypassing government systems, nowadays a sizeable chunk of aid is allocated 
to national support for recipient governments. Attention to some extent has shifted from mi-
cro-earmarking (e.g. donor money destined for an irrigation project in district x) to meso-ear-
marking (e.g. support for the agricultural sector) or macro-earmarking (e.g. support for the gov-
ernment budget to be allocated according to country priorities). Besides a continued interest in 
the impact of individual projects, donors, governments and nongovernmental institutions are 
increasingly interested in the impact of comprehensive programs, sector strategies or country 
strategies, often comprising multiple instruments, stakeholders, sites of intervention and target 
groups (see Jones et al. (2008) for a recent inventory of impact evaluations in different sectors 
of development intervention). 
In most countries donor organizations are (still) the main promoters of impact 
evaluation. The partial shift of the unit of analysis to the macro and (government) institutional 
level requires impact evaluators to pay more attention to complicated and more complex inter-
ventions at national, sector or program level. Multi-site, multi-governance and multiple (simul-
taneous) causal strands are important elements of this (see Rogers, 2008). At the same time, 
the need for more rigorous impact evaluation at the level of ‘single strand’ projects or activities 
remains as important as ever since they are the building blocks of higher-level programs and IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
policies. Furthermore, the ongoing efforts in capacity-building on national M&E systems (see 
Kusek and Rist, 2004; Morra and Rist, 2009) and the promotion of country-led evaluation ef-
forts stress the need for further guidance on impact evaluation at ‘single intervention’ level.
Within the light of the heterogeneous landscape of interventions, critics and (most) 
proponents of REs alike acknowledge the limitations in applicability of REs. What is problem-
atic is that the special status attributed to REs by some researchers and policymakers is likely 
to generate a bias in terms of too much evaluative focus on interventions that are amenable 
to this approach. Already development evaluation is biased in terms of what Ravallion calls a “ 
‘myopia bias’ in our knowledge, [with evaluation] favoring development projects that yield quick 
results” (Ravallion, 2008: 6). Similarly, Blattman (2008) refers to the ‘overevaluation’ of cer-
tain economic, educational and health interventions and the ‘underevaluation’ of interventions 
on peace-building, crime reduction, and governance issues (e.g. public management, decen-
tralization; see also Jones et al., 2008). REs are most readily applicable in case of discrete, ho-
mogenous interventions with clearly delineated target groups[1] rather than more complicated 
interventions, interventions that evolve during implementation or full-coverage interventions 
such as laws or macroeconomic policies (Bamberger and White, 2007; Rossi et al. 2004). Even 
in the case of rather simple interventions, quantitative researchers such as those handling REs 
find themselves opposed by anthropologists and sociologists who criticize the rather simplistic 
view of deconstructing interventions into neatly delineated packages of activities, benefits or 
treatments (see for example Hulme (2000) for a discussion). In contrast, they emphasize the 
complexity in social development interventions. Staff in such interventions “are not functionar-
ies dutifully providing a standardised service, such as immunising babies or distributing food 
rations; they are instead engaged in extensive face-to-face interaction with villagers over many 
months, making innumerable discretionary decisions. In many respects ‘the project’ is itself a 
dynamic decision-making process rather than a static ‘product’, and as such attempts to make 
causal claims regarding overall impact must address endemic unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
In short, on both the ‘demand side’ (local context) and the ‘supply side’ (front-line project staff) 
there is, by design, enormous variation” (Woolcock, 2009: 5). Indeed, identifying what the in-
tervention exactly is, where it begins and where it ends can be rather challenging (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997).
In case of complicated interventions (comprising multiple (interacting) interven-
tion components) at best sometimes only some of the components may be amenable to a RE. In 
case of interventions that focus on the institutional level (e.g. capacity-building, technical as-
sistance, administrative reform), corresponding evaluations look at one or a few units of analysis 
(i.e. the institution) -Bamberger and White (2007) call this the small n problem- a situation that 
is not amenable to a RE. Homogeneity of the intervention is another frequently referred to con-
dition for REs. A proper RE requires a high degree of homogeneity in intervention, target groups 
and context over time, conditions which are unlikely to hold in many cases. Often the nature of 
the intervention changes over time through adaptive learning, political pressures or to obtain 
more funding (e.g. adding training to subsidy programs). In addition, there might be changes in 
contextual factors that affect participants differently than control group members. For exam-
ple, rising output prices might speed up technology adoption processes among participants of 
a training program more than in the case of control group members who are facing a knowledge 
[1]	 	This	in	line	with	what	Ravallion	(2009b)	calls	assigned	programs.1 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
constraint. Given the above, if anything, a narrow focus on REs would reinforce an already exist-
ing evaluation bias towards particular types of interventions. 
3.3.   The impact on what?
3.3.1.  Institutional versus beneficiary level effects
The second issue, the impact on what, concerns the type of effects that we are in-
terested in. The causality chain linking policy interventions to ultimate policy goals (e.g. poverty 
alleviation) can be relatively direct and straightforward (e.g. the impact of vaccination programs 
on mortality levels) but also complex and diffuse. Impact evaluations of for example sector 
strategies or general budget support potentially encompass multiple causal pathways resulting 
in long-term direct and indirect impacts. Some of the causal pathways linking interventions to 
impacts may be fairly straightforward (e.g. from training programs in alternative income gener-
ating activities to employment and to income levels), whereas other pathways are more com-
plex and diffuse in terms of going through more intermediate changes, and being contingent 
upon more external variables (e.g. from stakeholder dialogue to changes in policy priorities to 
changes in policy implementation to changes in human welfare).
Figure 1.  Levels of intervention, programs and policies and types of impact
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Given this diversity it is useful for purposes of ´scoping´ to distinguish between 
two principal levels of impact: impact at the institutional level and impact at the beneficiary 
level (see Figure 1).[1] It broadens impact evaluation beyond either measuring whether objec-
tives have been achieved or assessing direct effects on intended beneficiaries. It includes the 
full range of impacts at all levels of the results chain, including ripple effects on families, house-
holds and communities, on institutional, technical or social systems, and on the environment. 
Interventions that can be labeled as institutional primarily aim at changing second-order con-
ditions (i.e. the capacities, willingness, and organizational structures enabling institutions to 
design, manage and implement better policies for communities, households and individuals). 
Examples are policy dialogues, policy networks, training programs, institutional reforms, and 
strategic support to institutional actors (i.e. governmental, civil society institutions, private cor-
porations, hybrids) and public private partnerships. Other types of interventions directly aim 
at/affect communities, households, individuals, including voters and taxpayers. Examples are 
fiscal reforms, trade liberalization measures, technical assistance programs, cash transfer pro-
grams, construction of schools, etc.
3.3.2.  Intended versus unintended effects
A widely endorsed reference to impact evaluation concerns the OECD-DAC defi-
nition, which defines impacts as (OECD-DAC, 2002: 24) “[p]ositive and negative, primary and 
secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, in-
tended or unintended”. However, when we look at the body of research under the banner of 
impact evaluation, a large part of it is not on long-term results, nor on indirect and unintended 
results. In fact, the body of evaluation research based on REs and quasi-experiments is usu-
ally about analyzing the attribution of short-term outcomes to a particular intervention (White, 
2009). Moreover, in order to permit a difference in difference estimation of the net effects of an 
intervention, only indicators of effects that are expected to be important are taken into account. 
As a result of the rather limited and rigid set of indicators employed within the framework of REs 
and quasi-experiments they are not very useful for identifying and analyzing unanticipated ef-
fects (see for example Davidson, 2006; Bamberger and White, 2007).
Policymakers are very much interested in the indirect diffusion, replication or scal-
ing-up effects of interventions. Whether intended or unintended they usually are ‘under’ the 
radar of REs as the analysis of these effects requires broadening the scope of indicators as well 
as the sampling framework of an impact evaluation. Replicatory effects in terms of behavio-
ral changes in actors beyond the original target group can stem from market responses (given 
that participants and non-participants trade in the same markets), the (non-market) behavior of 
participants/non-participants or the behavior of intervening agents (governmental/NGO). For 
example, “aid projects often target local areas, assuming that the local government will not re-
spond; yet if one village gets the project, the local government may well cut its spending on that 
village, and move to the control village” (Ravallion, 2008: 10). Another example concerns dis-
placement effects of environmentally damaging land use towards other areas beyond the grasp 
of an intervention; deforestation may increase elsewhere as land use becomes more restricted 
in certain areas.
[1]	 	In	addition,	one	can	discern	other	“levels”	such	as	replicatory	effects	and	systemic	effects.1 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
3.3.3.  Short-term versus long-term effects
In some types of interventions, effects emerge quickly. In others effects may take 
much longer to become manifest, and change over time. The timing of the evaluation is therefore 
important. Development interventions are usually assumed to contribute to long-term develop-
ment (with the exception of humanitarian disaster and emergency situations). However, focus-
ing on short-term or intermediate outcomes often provides for more useful and immediate in-
formation for policy- and decision-making. However, intermediate outcomes may be misleading, 
often differing markedly from those achieved in the longer term. Many of the impacts of interest 
from development interventions will only be evident in the longer-term, such as environmental 
changes, or effects on subsequent generations. Searching for evidence of such effects too early 
might mistakenly conclude that interventions have failed. 
In this context, the exposure time of an intervention to be able to make an impact 
is an important point. A typical agricultural innovation project that tries to change farmers’ be-
havior with incentives (training, technical assistance, credit) is faced with time lags in both the 
adoption effect (farmers typically are risk averse and face resource constraints and start adopt-
ing innovations on an experimental scale) as well as the diffusion effect (other farmers want to 
see evidence of results before they copy). In such gradual non-linear processes of change with 
cascading effects, the timing of the ex post measurement (of land use) is crucial. Ex post meas-
urements just after project closure could either underestimate (full adoption/diffusion of inter-
esting practices has not taken place yet) or overestimate impact (as farmers will stop investing 
in those land use practices that are not attractive enough to be maintained without project in-
centives).
Woolcock (2009) has recently highlighted a related problem. He argues that REs, 
and especially those that are based on a limited number of data points in time (e.g. before and 
after only), do not take into account the nature and dynamics of processes of change induced by 
an intervention. Processes of change are often not linear. In practice, processes of change often 
resemble j-curves or step functions. Examples of such processes are the effects of microcredit on 
empowerment (e.g. initial resistance by men until persistent and collective pressures lead to a 
shift in norms) or the adoption of new agricultural technologies (e.g. Rogers, 2003). The implica-
tion for REs is that for example if ex post measurement happens to take place when the change 
curve has hit a (temporal) low, then estimates of net effects will be entirely unrealistic. REs that 
are not supported by theory or data from additional methods of inquiry are not equipped to ad-
dress the abovementioned issues.[1]
[1]	 	It	is	important	to	mention	that	REs	using	a	simple	difference	in	difference	estimate	of	net	impact	(ex	ante	versus	
ex	post)	are	more	prone	to	error	than	designs	that	rely	on	multiple	waves	of	measurement	within	participant	and	con-
trol	groups.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
4.	 Challenge	2:	aTTribuTion	‘versus’	explanaTion
4.1.  Addressing the attribution challenge with randomized experiments
The OECD-DAC definition of impacts mentioned above refers to the ‘effects pro-
duced by’ an intervention, stressing the attribution aspect. This implies an approach to impact 
evaluation which is about attributing impacts rather than ‘merely’ assessing what happened.[1] 
Multiple factors can affect the livelihoods of individuals or the capacities of institutions. For 
policy makers as well as for stakeholders it is important to know what the added value is of the 
policy intervention apart from these other factors. The attribution problem is often referred to 
as the central problem in impact evaluation. The central question is to what extent can changes 
in outcomes of interest be attributed to a particular intervention?[2] Attribution refers both to 
isolating and estimating accurately the particular contribution of an intervention and ensuring 
that causality runs from the intervention to the outcome. In most contexts, adequate empirical 
knowledge about the effects produced by an intervention requires at least an accurate estimate 
of what would have occurred in the absence of the intervention (the counterfactual) and a com-
parison with what has occurred with the intervention implemented.
Box 1 – The attribution problem
Analyzing attribution requires comparing the situation ‘with’ an intervention to what would have happened 
in the absence of an intervention, the ‘without’ situation (the counterfactual). Such comparison of the situ-
ation ‘with and without’ the intervention is challenging since it is not possible to observe how the situation 
would have been without the intervention, and has to be constructed by the evaluator. The counterfactual 
is illustrated in the Figure below. The value of a target variable (point a) after an intervention should not be 
regarded as the intervention’s impact, nor is it simply the difference between the before and after situation 
(a-b, measured on the vertical axis; the dotted arrow). The net impact (at a given point in time) is the differ-
ence between the target variable’s value after the intervention (a) and the value the variable would have had 
in case the intervention would not have taken place (c).









b20 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
Usually interventions target particular groups, and in addition self selection effects 
may occur as more motivated or socially well-positioned individuals or groups gain access to a 
particular program. Consequently, one cannot simply compare the situation of participants over 
time with the population at large. Estimates would be distorted due to this selection bias prob-
lem. The safest way to avoid selection effects is a randomized selection of intervention group and 
control before the experiment starts. When the experimental group and the control group are 
selected randomly from the same eligible population, in sufficiently large samples both groups 
will have similar average characteristics (except that one group has been subjected to the inter-
vention and the other not). Consequently, in a well-designed and correctly implemented RE a 
simple comparison of average outcomes in the two groups can adequately resolve the attribu-
tion problem and yield accurate estimates of the net effect of the intervention on a variable of 
interest: by design, the only difference between the two groups was the intervention.
This powerful feature of REs explains the increasing popularity of this methodology. 
With a long tradition in medicine and public health and a much younger tradition in policy fields 
such as education and crime and justice (Leeuw, 2009), REs are now also increasingly applied 
in the context of (social) development interventions. Randomization is not always feasible, but 
a wide variety of quasi-experimental designs are available to ensure a high internal validity of 
findings. Basically, designs differ in terms of the technique used for creating comparable groups 
(e.g. regression discontinuity, propensity score matching, pipeline approaches) as well as in 
terms of the structure of periodic measurement within participant and control groups (e.g. sim-
ple ex ante – ex post participant group design, interrupted time series design; see for example 
Campbell, 1969; Cook and Campbell, 1979; Shadish et al., 2002, Morgan and Winship, 2007; for 
development interventions see for example Bamberger et al., 2006).[1] 
4.2.  Internal versus external validity
REs are typically equipped to address the question of what works within the partic-
ular confines of the experiment; they are strong on internal validity. However, policymakers are 
often interested in other questions (Heckman, 1992; Heckman et al., 1997; Ravallion, 2009b). 
Does this intervention also work in other regions or contexts? What happens when we go to 
scale with a particular intervention? What are the determinants of effectiveness? Another typi-
cal question that might not be easily answered with REs or quasi-experiments, is whether and 
how people are differently affected by an intervention.[2] This question can be answered with 
additional quantitative data analysis, if (large) data sets are available which allow for extensive 
modeling of confounders and interaction effects. Alternatively (or in addition), many qualitative 
methods such as case study methods can help evaluators to study in detail how interventions 
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Without further information results of a RE cannot be generalized beyond the ex-
perimental setting, as important confounders that are controlled for in the experiment are not 
revealed by the experiment itself. Moreover, “[t]he people who are normally attracted to a pro-
gram, taking account of the expected benefits and costs to them personally, may differ system-
atically from the random sample of people who were included in the trial” (Ravallion, 2008: 17). 
Critics of the ‘alleged superiority’ of REs argue that internal validity is not typically the question 
that policy makers are interested in and argue for more attention to external validity of findings, 
an aspect on which REs enjoy no comparative advantage (e.g. Rodrik, 2008; see Shadish et al. 
(2002) for a discussion on experiments and external validity). They argue that in order to be able 
to generalize findings from a RE to other settings, one needs to know how an intervention works, 
what are the determinants of the processes of change (possibly induced by an intervention), how 
an intervention might affect people in particular circumstances in different ways and what the 
time path and nature of the changes might be. In order to answer these types of questions (and 
others, see Ravallion, 2009b) one needs an informative explanatory theory (e.g. based on re-
search within the social sciences) and other (additional) methods of data collection and analysis 
(e.g. Van der Knaap et al., 2008; for the case of development interventions see Deaton, 2009). 
‘Randomistas’ have asserted that external validity of findings can be enhanced by 
doing a series of experiments in different contextual settings (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008). Yet as 
Ravallion argues, “the feasibility of doing a sufficient number of trials – sufficient to span the 
relevant domain of variation found in reality for a given program, as well as across the range of 
policy options – is far from clear. The scale of the randomized trials needed to test even one large 
national program could well be prohibitive” (Ravallion 2008: 19). Moreover, as Rodrik argues, 
“[f]ew randomized evaluations – if any – offer a structural model that describes how the pro-
posed policy will work, if it does, and under what circumstances it will not, if it doesn’t. Absent a 
full theory that is being put to a test, it is somewhat arbitrary to determine under what different 
conditions the experiment ought to be repeated.” (Rodrik, 2008: 21-22; italics added). A similar 
point is made by Deaton who asserts that “repeated successful replications of a ‘what works’ 
experiment is both unlikely and unlikely to be persuasive. Learning about theory, or mechanisms, 
requires that the investigation be targeted towards that theory, towards why something works, 
not whether it works” (Deaton, 2009: 31).
A special type of generalizability concerns the inference from small-scale pilots to 
up-scaled programs with broad coverage. In development contexts REs are often implemented 
on small scale pilots. While the outcomes of REs are considered as useful inputs in the decision 
to go to scale, REs alone are insufficient to support such a decision.[1] In case of scaling-up, con-
ditions at both the institutional level (of implementing agencies) as well as the beneficiary level 
invariably change, making the new intervention altogether different from the small-scale pilot it 
was derived from (Deaton, 2009). At the institutional level for example, the organizational set-
up might change completely, with new people with divergent capacities and interests managing 
and implementing the new intervention, or corrupt public officials suddenly being drawn to a 
scaled-up intervention which has appeared on their radar. In addition, new contextual condi-
tions and characteristics of target groups may confound intervention effects, this new heteroge-
neity not being covered by the original small-scale experiment (Ravallion, 2009a). On the other 
[1]	 	In	fact,	there	are	good	examples	of	REs	convincing	policymakers	to	scale	up	and	replicate	interventions.	For	ex-
ample,	the	spread	of	conditional	cash	transfer	programs	over	Latin	America	is	in	part	fuelled	by	the	evidence	produced	
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hand, it can be argued that a RE which has covered a sizeable sample can be quite informative on 
the likelihood that the same policy instrument will produce similar results when scaled up within 
the same population the RE sample was taken from.[1]
4.3.  Interventions as theories
Most critics of REs subscribe to the point of view that there is nothing that pre-
cludes REs from being more theory-based or -driven. Of course, in such cases it would be the 
combination of theory (or theories) and RE that would increase the external validity (and also 
internal validity) potential of REs rather than the RE format alone. Recently, more examples of 
theory-based REs can be found in the literature (see for example Banerjee (2005) or Banerjee 
and Duflo (2008) for illustrations).[2] Moreover, as argued by Cook (2006) REs are never com-
pletely theory-empty.[3] Among other things, they require substantive theory as guidance for 
selecting or constructing suitable measures of effects.
While REs in principle are not or need not be theory-empty, the abovementioned 
critique of Deaton and others on REs remains valid. REs are geared towards the question of 
whether an intervention works and do not shed much light on how and why interventions work. 
In order to look at the latter question, evaluation researchers need to look into the black box be-
tween output, outcome and impact indicators and reconstruct the underlying causality (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997). Two types of theory are of importance here. A reconstructed intervention the-
ory should adequately represent the main assumptions of decision makers, target groups and 
other stakeholders about causal pathways running from intervention to effects (see for example, 
Chen, 1990, Rogers et al., 2000; Leeuw, 2003). The intervention theory can be further enriched 
or tested by taking into account existing explanatory theories (from the social and behavioral 
sciences) on intervention contexts, processes of change and potential effects.
The idea that existing explanatory theories can improve the quality of evaluations 
is not a new one and has been discussed quite extensively in the literature (e.g. Riggin, 1990; 
Lipsey, 1993; Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006). For example, Riggin (1990) discusses how Etzioni’s 
theory of compliance can improve the quality of an evaluation of an employment assistance pro-
gram both at the stage of conceptualization as well as at the interpretation stage of an evalu-
ation. A first important role for ‘theory’ lies in the conceptualization of an evaluation question. 
Substantive theories help to point the evaluator toward the relevant constructs and relation-
ships between these constructs in order to make useful abstractions of the reality of a policy 
intervention, its intended effects and the wider context in which it is embedded, aspects which 
subsequently can be tested through empirical research. Substantive theory from past (evalua-
tion) research to some extent can help to anticipate these effects, which subsequently can be 
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lies in reinforcing the causal analysis, the analysis of how and to what extent changes in target 
variables can be attributed to a policy intervention. Relevant substantive theories can shed light 
on the nature of the causal relationships between interventions and (un)intended processes of 
change and help to rule out rival explanations for changes in target variables.[1] Finally, there is 
an important role for theory in the interpretation of evaluation findings. Theory can provide a 
useful framework for helping us to understand why certain changes have come 
about or provide insights into the relevant (contextual) variables which are likely to influence 
patterns of results across settings.
4.4.  The law of comparative advantages: theory-based and multi-method  
  evaluation 
My account so far has gradually led us the realization that REs are potentially 
strong on internal validity yet miss out on providing (strong) evidence on other aspects such as 
for example unanticipated and long-term effects and the external and construct validity of find-
ings. This brings us to the important realization that impact evaluations by default cannot and 
should not exclusively rely on one methodological design only.[2] The remainder of this section 
will add some more illustrative power to this argument.
As discussed elsewhere (Leeuw and Vaessen, 2009), the intervention theory con-
stitutes the guiding framework of impact evaluations. Typically, multiple causal assumptions 
emerge that require further testing in order to be able to claim whether the intervention has 
induced certain changes, and in what circumstances. However, not all causal assumptions can 
be tested with the same methodological design or specific method. For example, consider the 
effects of subsidies for sustainable land use on biodiversity. One can envisage a useful RE which 
tests the effects of subsidies on the land use behavior of farmers. The subsequent causal step 
from land use behavior to biodiversity cannot be tested so easily by means of a RE. One of the 
main reasons is that biodiversity depends on plot-specific variables (e.g. the type of vegetation 
on a certain plot of land) as well as on determinants at higher levels such as the connectivity be-
tween systems of land use, the proximity of certain biospheres, the geographical location with 
respect to migration routes of birds and other species, and so on. Moreover, as argued above, 
there are other challenges such as the non-linearity, uncertainty and sustainability of changes.
Ideally, the intervention theory should provide guidance on the choice of causal 
assumptions to be analyzed (see Weiss (2000) for a discussion on this) and correspondingly, dif-
ferent designs and methods can be used to assess specific assumptions. In addition, other com-
plementary perspectives on the use of multiple methods can be discerned in the literature (for a 
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Let us briefly illustrate three ‘logics’ for multi-method approaches in impact evalu-
ation. The first starts out from Campbell’s framework of different types of validity. As suggested 
earlier in this paper, specific methods have comparative advantages in ensuring a high degree 
of internal/external/construct validity. Consider a similar example as introduced above, i.e. an 
intervention that provides monetary incentives and training to farmers in order to promote land 
use changes leading to improved livelihoods conditions as well as other effects. Simplified, a 
comprehensive methodological design could be the following:
E.g. a randomized experiment with the use of survey data on participant and con-
trol groups could be used to assess the effectiveness of different incentives on land use change 
and/or socio-economic effects of these changes (potentially strengthens internal validity of 
findings);
E.g. further survey data (multivariate) analysis and case studies could tell us how 
incentives have different effects on particular types of farm households (potentially strengthens 
internal validity and increases external validity of findings);
E.g. targeted syntheses of existing research, semi-structured interviews and fo-
cus group conversations could tell us more about the nature of effects in terms of production, 
consumption, poverty, environment etc. (potentially enhances construct and internal validity of 
findings).
A second framework of multi-method evaluation has been labeled the ‘shoestring’ 
approach (see Bamberger et al., 2004). It refers to a number of scenarios of multi-method ap-
proaches which are adapted to particular conditions of budget, time and data constraints. These 
scenarios all rely on an intervention theory model as a basis for different methodological strate-
gies to simplify evaluation design (e.g. in relation to text book REs), reduce costs of data collec-
tion and analysis, and integrate qualitative and quantitative methods.[1]
A third illustration of a multi-method perspective is Woolcock’s account of differ-
ent options to gain a better understanding of the nature of causal pathways. “There are at least 
three entry points, each of increasing degrees of sophistication. The first is simply raw experi-
ence: seasoned project managers should have a good sense of how long and in what form the 
impacts associated with a particular project in a particular context should take to materialise. 
[…] Astute intuition and seasoned field experience combined with solid theory should provide 
a second avenue: the very essence of a good theory should be that it provides a sense and a 
justification of the conditions under which, and mechanisms by which, certain project outcomes 
should be expected. […] Thirdly, the regular collection of empirical evidence can itself be a basis 
for determining the shape of the project’s impact trajectory, and is ultimately (for researchers at 
least) the most defensible basis on which to do so” (Woolcock, 2009: 7-8).
[1]	 	See	also	Bamberger	et	al.	(2009)	for	further	discussion	on	mixed	methods	in	the	context	of	impact	evaluation.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
5.	 Challenge	3:	impaCT	evaluaTion	in	praCTiCe
5.1. Threats to attribution analysis in experimental settings
The main threats to the internal validity of findings from REs (and certain quasi-ex-
periments) are well-known and widely discussed (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Campbell, 1969; 
Cook and  Campbell, 1979; Shadish et al., 2002):
Selection bias: refers to the problem of under- or overestimating intervention ef-
fects due to uncontrolled differences between different (treatment) groups that would lead to 
differences in effect variables if none of the groups would have received benefits.
Contagion (or treatment diffusion): refers to the problem of groups that are not 
supposed to be exposed to (or receiving) certain benefits are in fact benefiting from an interven-
tion in one or more ways: by directly receiving the benefits from the intervention, by indirectly 
receiving benefits through other participants, or by receiving similar benefits from other organi-
zations.
Aging/Maturation: An effect that arises when participants grow older, wiser, more 
tired, more self-confident due to factors other than the intervention.
History: The effect is caused by some event other than the intervention occurring 
during the same time period as the intervention.
Testing: The pre-test measurement causes a change in the post-test measure.
Instrumentation: The effect is caused by a change in the method of measuring the 
outcome.
Regression to the Mean: Where an intervention is implemented on units with un-
usually high scores (e.g. unusually high student performance scores), natural fluctuation will 
cause a decrease in these scores on the post-test which may be mistakenly interpreted as an 
effect of the intervention.
Attrition: Changes in effect measurements due to drop-outs.
Causal Order: It is unclear whether the intervention preceded the outcome.
Behavioral responses: Several unintended behavioral responses not caused by the 
intervention or ‘normal’ conditions might inhibit the reliability of comparisons between groups 
and hence the ability to attribute changes to the intervention. An example is expected behavior 
or compliance behavior: beneficiaries’ behavior is not caused by intervention outputs (e.g. a sub-
sidy) but due to reasons of compliance with a (formal/informal) contract between beneficiary 
and implementing organization, due to the (longstanding) relationship with a particular organi-
zation (delivering intervention outputs), or due to certain expectations about future benefits 
from the organization (not necessarily the intervention).
While each of these issues might be potential problems that render claims on at-
tribution less valid, the fact that they have been systematically identified and addressed in the 
literature (see for example Cook and Campbell, 1979) enhances the scientific rigor of experimen-
tal and quasi-experimental designs.
A key underlying determinant of the internal validity of findings from REs is the ex-
tent to which those managing the experiment are capable and willing to safeguard the design 
from the threats to validity described above. This is certainly the case for selection bias and 
treatment diffusion issues; well-designed REs may be safeguarded from these problems. More 
complicated is the potential threat from unintended behavioral responses among participant 
or control groups. As argued by several authors (e.g. Deaton, 2009; Cohen and Easterly, 2009) 2 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
randomization can lead to hard feelings between the different groups involved in the experi-
ment. “[S]ubjects may fail to accept assignment, so that people who are assigned to the experi-
mental group may refuse, and controls may find a way of getting the treatment, and either may 
drop out of the experiment altogether. The classical remedy of double blinding, so that neither 
the subject nor the experimenter know which subject is in which group, is rarely feasible in social 
experiments” (Deaton, 2009: 36). In some cases researchers cannot (and indeed should not) 
withhold the information from stakeholders that they are part of an experiment. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2008) provide several examples of mechanisms (e.g. lotteries) which facilitate the col-
laboration of local populations in an experiment. Yet, even in situations where institutions and 
target groups agree to randomized allocation of benefits, it is well-known in the literature (e.g. 
Campbell, 1969; Shadish et al., 2002) that experimentation may lead to a range of unintended 
behavioral responses within the participant and treatment groups which can affect the validity 
of findings resulting from an experiment. An example of unintended behavioral responses comes 
from the famous PROGRESA study (see for example Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001). “One is-
sue with the explicit acknowledgement of randomization as a fair way to allocate the program is 
that implementers will find that the easiest way to present it to the community is to say that an 
expansion of the program is planned for the control areas in the future (especially when it is in-
deed the case, as in phased-in designs). This may cause problems if the anticipation of treatment 
leads individuals to change their behavior. This criticism was made in the case of the PROGRESA 
programs, where control villages knew that they were going to eventually be covered by the 
program” (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008: 22).
 
5.2.  Other design and implementation challenges
A key issue regarding the success of REs in practice revolves around the ethics and 
feasibility of randomization in practice and the corresponding reactions by stakeholders. Experi-
ments can cause resentment as people do not understand or support the differences in benefits 
allocated to different groups. Random allocation in many cases is also unacceptable to policy 
makers (e.g. Bamberger and White, 2007; Ravallion, 2008). Interventions are often intended to 
be targeted to specific groups and outreach is a direct concern to policy makers. Randomization 
would limit outreach and at the same time is often considered as unethical in view of the press-
ing needs of target populations.[1]
Banerjee and Duflo (2008: 22) argue that collaboration with institutions in devel-
oping countries is becoming less of an issue in developing countries. “Randomization that takes 
place at the level of location can piggy-back on the expansion of the organization’s involvement 
in these areas limited by budget and administrative capacity, which is precisely why they agree 
to randomize. Limited government budgets and diverse actions by many small NGOs mean that 
villages or schools in most developing countries are used to the fact that some areas get some 
programs and others do not and when a NGO only serve some villages, they see it as a part of 
the organization’s overall strategy. When the control areas [are] given the explanation that the 
program had only enough budget for a certain number of schools, they typically agree that a lot-
tery was a fair way to allocate it---they are often used to such arbitrariness and so randomiza-
tion appears transparent and legitimate”. 
Another way to enhance the goodwill among implementing agencies is to forge a 
[1]	 	This	often	provides	a	compelling	argument	for	using	quasi-experimental	designs.	For	example,	regression	dis-
continuity	is	very	useful	when	targeting	is	based	on	clear	and	easy	to	measure	criteria	of	selection.IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
longstanding relationship between the latter and RE researchers in which a series of experi-
ments will constitute the basis of a cumulative process of learning. It still remains to be seen 
however what the costs and benefits of such a relationship would be in divergent institutional 
contexts, especially in view of the previously discussed issues. Institutional willingness to un-
dertake a RE is not a black and white issue, as interventions typically comprise multiple institu-
tional partners and multiple layers of management, from headquarters to field level. The idea of 
institutional willingness is also closely related to institutional capacities and incentives. REs are 
intrinsically linked to intervention implementation processes and the question to what extent 
well-trained researchers are de facto present and able to ensure the quality control of experi-
mental conditions, is an empirical one that merits further inquiry. There is a marked difference 
between an experienced research team undertaking REs (as is the case for most of the pub-
lished work on REs in development) and the idea of mainstreaming REs in the design of selected 
projects of donor and developing country agencies’ portfolios. In the latter case invariably not 
all the tasks pertaining to the design and implementation of a RE are managed by experienced 
and motivated researchers.
Apart from institutional capacities, willingness to collaborate and ethics, other 
challenges remain. A first obvious condition for REs is the active involvement of researchers or 
evaluators in the intervention design and implementation phase. This involvement is essential 
for baseline data collection as well as quality control of randomization. In practice however, 
many impact evaluations are commissioned after an intervention has been implemented and 
baseline data continue to be a problem (Bamberger and White, 2007). Although preferably dou-
ble difference (participant-control group comparisons over time) designs should be used, it is 
more usual that impact assessments are based on less rigorous – and reliable – designs, where 
baseline data are reconstructed or collected later during the implementation phase, or baseline 
data are collected only for the treatment group, or there are no baseline data for neither treat-
ment nor control group (for options on how to address these constraints see Bamberger et al., 
2004; Bamberger et al. 2006; or White and Bamberger, 2007).
A second aspect is the costs of doing REs. Early experiences of REs (and quasi-ex-
perimental studies) in development by the World Bank turned out to be rather costly (OED, 2005), 
but these studies were often quite ambitious in scope. More recent experiences seem to suggest 
that REs do not necessarily have to be more expensive than other non-experimental observa-
tional studies that are based on original fieldwork with multiple data points in time. However, 
given the narrow focus of REs, when large programs with multiple intervention activities need to 
be evaluated, REs need to compete with less expensive non-experimental methodologies which 
can cover a broader scope of activities with less budget. Proponents of REs will need to justify 
if the potential gains in terms of the high internal validity of findings delivered by an RE will be 
worthwhile the investment given the loss in scope. Alternatively, adversaries of experimenta-
tion or others that choose scope over depth will have to justify that alternative methodological 
designs adequately address crucial issues such as attribution.
 A third issue concerns the quality of the data. Bamberger and White (2007) argue 
that problems of data quality, although relevant for any type of methodological design, might 
be particularly problematic in case of REs as they rely one a limited number of indicators. Ban-
erjee and Duflo (2008) contest this idea. In their view, if data is being collected especially for 2 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
the purposes of a RE, then given the limited number of observations that are usually necessary 
for reliable estimates, researchers are able to dedicate special attention to data collection and 
measurement issues. Ensuring high data quality is particularly challenging in rural contexts in 
developing countries.[1] Surveys continue to be the main instruments generating impact evalu-
ation data. Potential measurement errors due to problems of recall, sensitivity of certain topics, 
intercultural communication, translation errors are just a few of the problems that affect data 
quality (see for example De Leeuw et al., 2008; Mikkelsen, 2005; Bamberger et al., 2004; Bam-
berger, 2000). Moreover, surveys may not be appropriate for addressing sensitive topics (see 
for example Bamberger et al., 2009) such as for domestic violence, household income or local 
norms and in these cases are more likely to generate unreliable data. Unfortunately, data quality 
is not as sexy a topic as methodological design, especially if the latter is the acclaimed basis for 
delivering ‘rigorous scientific evidence’.
[1]	 	For	a	rather	critical	perspective	on	data	quality	in	(rural)	developing	country	contexts,	see	Gill	(1993).IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 • A Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
6.	 some	lessons	for	randomized	experimenTs	and	impaCT	evaluaTion	in		
	 general	from	The	perspeCTive	of	a	‘non-randomisTa’	
The controversy surrounding the promotion and application of REs in development 
has led to a sense of polarization in the development policy and evaluation community. As some 
proponents claim epistemological supremacy of REs (with respect to attribution) the counter 
reaction among others has been rejection. Needless to say, such extreme positions are counter-
productive to reaching a goal that is commonly endorsed: to learn more about what works and 
why in development. Polarization leads to ‘argument mining’, with proponents bringing up (ar-
guably valid) arguments in defense of REs while adversaries pick their favorite (and arguably val-
id) arguments against REs. Clearly, this is not the way forward on the path to knowledge growth. 
If one explores the growing body of evidence in development generated through REs, one can-
not deny the positive (though divergent) direct and indirect benefits to knowledge generation 
about what works. At the same time, as acknowledged by most scholars in the literature, the 
applicability of REs is limited to certain contexts. Moreover, as illustrated previously, the range 
of potential challenges (including different questions) to be addressed in an empirical exercise 
of assessing what works and why in development intervention is too broad to be adequately 
addressed by REs only. By presenting a diverse array of methodological and conceptual perspec-
tives on impact evaluation this paper has illustrated potential benefits but also limitations as 
well as complementary perspectives to REs. The implicit lesson is twofold. First of all, the ques-
tion ‘to randomize or not to randomize’ is overrated in the current debate. Other challenges de-
mand the attention of policymakers and evaluation researchers alike. Second, ‘do not throw out 
the baby with the bath water’. There is a risk that the current popularity of REs in certain policy 
circles might lead to a backlash. Too high expectations of REs may quicken its demise. 
An important barrier to RE application is that policy-driven impact evaluations, i.e. 
impact evaluations commissioned by funding or implementing agencies, often favor scope over 
depth. With a limited budget, evaluators are forced to develop plausible statements on impact 
over a range of intervention activities in divergent contexts. In such cases, a tension between 
accountability (implying a coverage of most or all of the funded activities) and learning (giving 
more attention to one particular intervention or type of intervention) may exist.[1] Even if the 
applicability range of REs broadens in the future due to new experiences (e.g. experiments at the 
institutional level), aspects such as implementation challenges (e.g. the ethics, logistics of doing 
REs but also the willingness among policy makers, implementing agencies and other stakehold-
ers to transform intervention formats into randomized experiments), budget allocation priori-
ties (e.g. scope versus depth) and other limitations will inevitably restrict RE-type evaluations to 
being a minority practice in the impact evaluation business (see below).
The realization that there are inherent limitations in applicability of REs should not 
be an argument against the further promotion of REs. Nor should the range of threats to va-
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briefly discuss a few points of interest here. First, experimentation should not be perceived as 
an anomaly in development intervention. The policy field of education in the Netherlands is in 
this aspect not much different from the policy field of agricultural technologies in Latin America. 
From the former perspective, Borghans (2009) argues that teachers continuously experiment 
with teaching methods, whereas the target group, students, are continuously  receiving differ-
ent ‘treatments’, for example simply by going to different schools. Similarly, in Latin America (or 
elsewhere), farmers and development agencies alike continuously experiment with new tech-
niques and new intervention activities to achieve particular desired objectives.[1] If one consid-
ers a specific sample of farmers or agencies, at any given point in time, one can identify a range of 
similar yet different practices aimed at boosting productivity per unit of land given particular re-
source constraints. Observation over time in combination with a systematic variation in respec-
tively the application or promotion of certain techniques, are common behavior among farmers, 
cooperatives, NGOs or state agencies. A RE is a more systematic approach to experimentation 
than what most stakeholders are used to. As argued by Borghans (2009) from the perspective of 
education in the Netherlands, if we take this experimenting attitude as a given, then one would 
expect it to become more acceptable and desirable for decision makers and target groups to 
organize and participate in more systematic experiments, such as REs. In the context of de-
velopment interventions Banerjee and Duflo (2008) talk about developing long-term working 
relationships between researchers and development agencies. In such conditions it is possible 
to show that a RE is much more efficient in proving whether something works than much of the 
haphazard experimentation that goes on in the daily practice of target groups and implement-
ing agencies. And it is in such cases that the comparative advantage of a RE can truly blossom: it 
magnifies heterogeneity in ‘treatment’ by introducing a clear comparative perspective between 
those with and without an intervention and it reduces bias in estimation of effects through the 
principle of randomization. These are two powerful features that help us to identify efficiently 
what works for a particular group in a particular context.
Now, in order to go from a specific setting to a more generalizable conclusion about 
effectiveness we need theory. To illustrate this, consider the adoption of certain organic farm-
ing practices. We know from research that knowledge and labor substitute for capital. In other 
words, less inputs are bought on the market in exchange for an increased input of labor and 
knowledge. Peasant economics (e.g. Ellis, 1988) and the diffusion of innovation literature (e.g. 
Rogers, 2003) teach us that the opportunity costs of labor (next to a range of other variables, 
and contingent upon among other things the type of crop) is an important explanatory variable 
of smallholder adoption behavior. With this information in mind we can test whether this theory 
holds for a specific farmer population or region. For example, we may set up a clustered RE with 
different samples in several regions which mainly differ in the opportunity costs of labor yet 
are similar in other potential explanatory variables (as derived from theory). While this example 
may not be water tight, it can prove to be very informative on the effectiveness of certain policy 
instruments (e.g. subsidies, training) in promoting the adoption of organic practices and at the 
same time test whether the opportunity costs of labor is a decisive factor in adoption behav-
ior. Of course, the stratification may be a little bit more complex as more explanatory variables 
(derived from theory) may determine the setup of the series of REs. The core idea is that in this 
way REs may more effectively contribute to existing theories on the determinants of adoption 
present	in	most	(research-driven)	RE	studies	which	feature	so	prominently	in	the	literature.
[1]	 	However,	smallholder	farmers	are	often	risk	averse	and	tend	to	experiment	on	a	small	scale.	Once	a	particular	
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processes. In general, it shows that theory may be rigorously tested by means of REs and that 
theory itself can be a guideline for determining how to set up a series of REs (see also Cohen and 
Easterly, 2009, for a discussion on the theory-testing potential of REs). Limitations to external 
validity remain, especially with respect to scaling-up effects. Nevertheless, a theory-driven RE 
is potentially stronger on external validity than a ‘theory-empty’ RE. As commented by Deaton 
(2009) and also Banerjee and Duflo (2008) the number of theory-informed and theory-testing 
REs is on the increase. This is important as REs without a basis in theory are prone to be weaker 
not only in terms of external validity, but also the internal validity and construct validity of find-
ings.
The biggest gains from this growing attention for rigorous impact evaluation, this 
‘new push for objective evidence’ as one may call it, are not to be found in the growing body of 
REs but rather in its spin-offs. Whereas development evaluations used to be largely on process 
issues or output delivery, the paradigm shift in development policy towards more attention for 
results has strengthened the belief across the developing world that interventions should not be 
based on hunches, intuitions or ideologies but on evidence on whether an intervention is likely 
to make a difference in terms of the desired objectives. A randomized experiment in a way is one 
of the elegant flagships of this new evolution. As a methodological design it has drawn a lot of 
attention yet it is unlikely to win the war on its own. Several other trends and opportunities can 
be noted which in part have been strengthened by the ‘randomista’ movement. These (partial) 
‘spin-offs’[1] point at other challenges in impact evaluation. First of all, a RE is just one of the 
designs based on explicit counterfactual analysis. The number of quasi-experimental studies in 
development has increased sharply over the last ten years or so. For example, where randomiza-
tion is not possible or appropriate, regression discontinuity analysis may be used instead, as it 
relies on a different principle for the definition of groups.[2] In addition, as data gathering efforts 
have increased under the influence of results-based thinking and new M&E systems, opportuni-
ties for ex post statistical matching or multivariate analyses with statistical controls have also 
markedly increased.
This paper has focused on design and implementation issues in impact evaluation, 
scarcely touching upon the large and expanding body of statistical impact evaluations. Statisti-
cal techniques are often used within the framework of (quasi-)experimental designs but more of-
ten than not in non-experimental settings. Comparative advantages of (non-experimental) sta-
tistical impact evaluations are among other things their broad coverage in terms of the number 
of individuals, households, districts, and regions encompassed by the data sets. The increased 
availability of data and the growing capacities (in terms of expertise and technological support) 
to process and analyze these data have enhanced the opportunities for impact evaluation at 
aggregate (e.g. regional) levels. The issue of the comparative advantage of REs vis-à-vis non-ex-
perimental statistical analyses has been briefly raised in this paper. One particular argument all 
too often is ignored. As a methodological design requiring active manipulation of an interven-
tion, an RE relies on original data, collected specifically for the purposes of the study. In most 
cases, the evaluation researchers analyzing the data are also involved in the data collection. In 
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sis. Not necessarily so in statistical impact evaluation exercises. All too often data analyses are 
based on data sets constructed by others for other purposes. Econometricians and economists 
involved in statistical impact evaluations using (mostly) non-experimental data tend to overem-
phasize ‘threats to validity’ in the data analysis phase (e.g. specifying the right selection model) 
and often blatantly ignore (or are ignorant of) any problems or biases that may have arisen in 
the data collection phase. The severed link between data collection and analysis in many impact 
evaluation exercises is distressing and merits a higher profile in methodological debates.
Data quality is also a concern in the literature on mixed methods in impact evalua-
tion.[1] Previously, I already underlined the importance of mixed methods from the perspective 
of comparative advantages of methods. Two other reasons make this area of research particu-
larly relevant to policymakers and evaluation researchers. First of all, practically all evaluation 
work is multi-method in nature. This is most clearly visible in large program or portfolio evalu-
ations where approach papers and evaluation matrices specify the range of data collection and 
analysis tools used to analyze specific questions. A second reason is that the majority of impact 
evaluations take place under less than ideal circumstances (see Bamberger et al., 2009). Often 
evaluation researchers are not present in the design phase of interventions; they are called in 
when an intervention is already in the implementation phase or after completion. Consequently, 
evaluators often have to resort to baseline reconstruction, secondary data or ex post data only. 
In addition, budgets often do not permit large sample sizes or elaborate designs with multiple 
group comparisons. Pressures on scope further limit the chances of evaluators to set up for ex-
ample a solid quasi-experiment. Time pressures may force evaluators to do the work in ‘quicker 
and dirtier’ ways than what is needed to appropriately address the attribution issue. Methodo-
logical options for mixed method evaluations under less than ideal circumstances are existent 
yet, as argued by one of the principal authors on this subject, Michael Bamberger, much remains 
to be done in terms of developing new methodologies and standards for mixed method evalua-
tions (see for example Bamberger et al., 2004, 2009).
If decision makers want answers to their questions on what works across inter-
ventions and across contexts, they may need to change part of their focus. Instead of seeing 
administrative categories such as projects or country portfolios as the only principal units of 
analysis (often mainly for accountability purposes) they need to look more at particular policy 
instruments or intervention types which recur throughout projects.[2] Consequently, decision 
makers may learn to appreciate and invest more in rigorous evaluations of particular interven-
tion types (e.g. using REs) and see how these pieces of evidence connect to the macro picture, i.e. 
looking at the importance of a particular intervention type and the divergent contexts in which 
it is implemented. Such a focus on particular intervention types and policy instruments can per-
fectly coexist with more comprehensive approaches to impact evaluation which start out from 
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We know there are no laws in social sciences (Elster, 2007), yet we also know there 
patterns of regularity, or demi-regularities, in individual, social and institutional behavior (Paw-
son, 2009). Identifying and refining such patterns of regularity require a particular way of theo-
rizing about interventions, deconstructing or unpacking interventions into their active ingredi-
ents: policy instruments linked to contexts linked to behavioral mechanisms (see Pawson, 2006, 
2009). It is our mission as development researchers and evaluators to uncover these patterns 
of (demi-)regularities as they are the building stones of knowledge about what works and why 
across interventions. Intervention theories with a certain degree of external validity are becom-
ing more and more important in the context of review and synthesis work as well. 3IE is one of 
the organizations which is currently investing in this type of work (for an example on microcredit 
see Vaessen et al., 2009).[1] We still have a long way to go. One thing is for sure, we need good 
empirical impact evaluations – ;which rely on intervention theory, explanatory theory and mul-
tiple methods tailored to a specific context – in order to succeed, eventually…
 
[1]	 Comparable	to	the	work	by	institutions	such	as	the	Campbell	and	the	Cochrane	Collaboration	on	health,	educa-
tion,	crime	and	justice	and	social	work,	based	on	empirical	work	from	(mostly)	OECD	countries.	34 • IOB DIscussIOn PaPer 2010-01 Challenges in impact evaluation of development interventions
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